Thursday, April 17, 2008

Incidentally, The Economist did a review this week of Tony Judt's new book (see previous post). Not all parts of the book are "worthy of George Orwell" in their opinion, but somehow I think it'll end up on the shelves of our library in the not too distant future...

...and here's another from the New York Times Book Review (Apr. 20, 2008), suggesting that Judt as a historian is almost as complex as the 20th century itself.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

The Shadow of the Twentieth Century

After having finished a monumental volume on European history since 1945, Tony Judt shifted his focus to reflecting on the impact of the twentieth century on 21st-century politics and how it views the history of the past century. The central question he asks is: what have we learned, if anything, from the twentieth century? He reflects at length on this question in a soon-to-be-released book called Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century. In an essay in the current issue of the New York Review of Books (May 1st, 2008), he gives us a snapshot of his ideas.

One of his premises is that America and Europe (and, by extensions, the rest of the world) have differing views on the utility of war because of their very different experiences with it over the course of the 20th century. So, even if the US suffered or faced defeats in Vietnam and currently in Iraq, it has never experienced invasion from abroad or outright occupation. As a consequence, says Judt,

"...the United States today is the only advanced democracy where public figures glorify and exalt the military, a sentiment familiar in Europe before 1945 but quite unknown today. Politicians in the US surround themselves with the symbols and trappings of armed prowess; even in 2008 American commentators excoriate allies that hesitate to engage in armed conflict. I believe it is this contrasting recollection of war and its impact, rather than any structural difference between the US and otherwise comparable countries, which accounts for their dissimilar responses to international challenges today. Indeed, the complacent neoconservative claim that war and conflict are things Americans understand—in contrast to naive Europeans with their pacifistic fantasies —seems to me exactly wrong: it is Europeans (along with Asians and Africans) who understand war all too well. Most Americans have been fortunate enough to live in blissful ignorance of its true significance."

In turn, this experience (as a perspective on history and the role of war), combined with what Judt calls "the abstracting of foes and threats from their contexts" would make it all to easy to repeat the mistakes of the 20th century.

In an era in which, pace prof Hanhimaki, cold war studies are increasingly being seen as a "thing of the past" with little if anything to teach to a post-September 11 world, Tony Judt wants to demonstrate that the twentieth century has in fact much to teach us in the 21st, no matter how distant a memory the fall of the Berlin Wall is already becoming.

How do you look at this historiographical issue? Do you think Judt is right about the differences in impact that war has had both in America and Europe in the 20th century, and that seen from that perspective, it's the inhabitants of the 'Kantian paradise' (i.e, Europe, in Robert Kagan's words) who are more realist(ic) about the consequences and potential utility of warfare? And what about the link between an appetite for war and the use of anti-democratic means (such as torture of suspending habeas corpus) to wage the 'war on terror'? Is this indeed a consequence of the 'abstracting' of the enemy? Judt adds on this point that "if Osama bin Laden were truly comparable to Hitler or Stalin, would we really have responded to September 11 by invading...Baghdad?" So, if the lessons from twentieth-century history do not stop us from waging war on abstract nouns, can they at least help to prevent us from employing the same means as were used by some of the most vicious regimes of the past 100 years? If anything, the lessons to be drawn from the past century have not been exhausted in the least. And that's not even to talk about understanding and acting upon them...

Thursday, April 3, 2008

NATO SUMMIT AND IRAN'S THREAT

The NATO Summit in Bucharest agreed to back U.S. plans to site a missile defense system in the east of Europe, notably Poland and Czech Republic. President George Bush insisted at the summit that the system was not to be used against Russia, but it was needed to counter a potential threat from rogue states like Iran. Regardless of how Russia will react to this decision by NATO, the question is whether Iran’s threat against Europe is real. President Bush has repeatedly said that Iran is seeking nuclear “weapons” in order to “attack” other countries and start a “third world war.” But how much do these claims reflect the truth? As we know, there were no WMDs in Iraq to threaten world peace and security. All the same, and despite the propaganda in Western media, there is no imminent threat of an Iranian atomic bomb. The IAEA inspectors have, thus far, not found any evidence of deviation in Iran’s nuclear program towards military purposes. Even according to U.S. intelligence (as reflected in the recently published National Intelligence Estimate), Iran has no intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, Iran is by no means posing an “imminent” threat against the world's peace and security, and following this case at the level of the Security Council seems at least partly unreasonable. The U.S. and other Western powers also seem to have adopted double standards and discriminatory policies against Iran, as compared to the other nuclear states in the region, such as Israel, Pakistan, and India. While none of latter countries is a member to the Non Proliferation Treaty, Iran has joined the NPT as early as 1968 and even signed in 2003 the Additional Protocol, which allows the IAEA inspectors to investigate the country’s nuclear installations at any time and with no prior notice.
Iran’s security concerns should be recognized at the international level. Iran is now encircled by American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the United States has established various military bases throughout the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Moreover, the region of the Middle East has experienced several bloody wars over the past decades, one of which was imposed on Iran by Western-supported Saddam Hussein for more than eight years. Even in this threatening environment, Iran is still denied basic conventional defensive weapons by the United States and the European Union. Although Iran has not invaded another country for almost two hundred years, it is still portrayed in the Western media as an aggressive “rogue” state and a threat to the region, and even Europe. Since 1979, Iran has been under severe unilateral sanctions from the United States. These sanctions have even prevented Iran from purchasing passenger airplanes or their spare parts, which directly jeopardizes the safety of civilians. This treatment has made the Iranian leaders highly wary about any possibility that the Western powers will ever be dependable partners. Iran has developed a missile system in the recent years under such a state of insecurity. Any other country under these same circumstances would also feel insecure and try to strengthen its defensive capacity before being attacked. But there is no reason for Iran whatsoever to use this capacity to start a war against Europe!
The development of a nuclear program has also become a matter of national pride for many Iranians. The United States, however, insists on the total and permanent suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities. After the NIE report was revealed, President Bush openly admitted that the challenge with Iran was no longer about the threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb, but about the Iranians having acquired nuclear “knowledge.” This not only denies Iran’s legal rights, as provided for in the NPT, but it also further antagonizes the Iranian people against U.S. policies, uniting them behind the current hard-line government in Tehran. However, it has now become clear that the zero-enrichment objective is more or less unachievable, and Iran’s nuclear program continues to progress faster than the West can muster pressure on Tehran.
To put an end to the existing crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, there is no option but diplomacy. But the ultimate goal should not be to deprive Iran of the right to nuclear knowledge, but to ensure that the existing concerns about a military deviation in this program will be properly addressed, for example, through more regular inspections by IAEA. Simultaneously, the United States and other Western powers should try to persuade other nuclear countries in the region to put an end to their military nuclear arsenals, in order to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, with a basis in collective security. This will surely be more helpful for global peace than the installation of anti-missile systems in Europe!